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This article draws on Bourdieu’s theorisation of domination and
Gramsci’s notions of hegemony within the context of a larger empirical
study of Australian university academic governance, and of academic
boards (also known as academic senates or faculty senates) in particular.
Reporting data that suggest a continued but radically altered form of
collegial governance in which hegemony is exercised by management
rather than by the professor, it theorises the domination of academic
boards within western democratic universities. However, traditional
collegial governance is also dependent upon a community of scholars, a
role historically played by the academic board. In view of the suggested
transition in collegial governance and the resultant convergence of aca-
demic work and management, the article concludes with questions about
whether academic boards can continue to serve as communities of
scholars in future.
Keywords: Bourdieu; Gramsci; higher education; academic governance;
organisational change
Introduction
Changes in university governance within the 30 years reﬂect movement
away from traditional collegial governance towards managerial and more
corporate-style, entrepreneurial governance modes (Bleiklie 2012). Com-
mencing in the 1980s in the United Kingdom and spreading rapidly within
other Anglophone nation-states (Blackmore and Sachs 2007), this transfor-
mation was driven by in part by changes in government thinking about
higher education. It also reﬂected shifts towards public-sector governance
practices, and the implementation of market and competition-driven
neoliberal style policies for higher education (Ball 2012), particularly within
Australia (Meek 2003b). While under the former welfare state higher
education was considered a public or community responsibility, it is now a
private and individual beneﬁt under which an increasing proportion of the
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cost is borne by the student (Rizvi and Lingard 2010). Proliferation of stu-
dent numbers has led to a reduction in per-student government funding,
supplemented by fee-paying students (OECD 2007). Moreover, the impact
of globalisation has contributed to international competition amongst elite
research-intensive universities, fuelling widespread pressures arising from
the impact of international ranking scales (Marginson 2008).
While direct government involvement in higher education provision has
reduced, demands for an education system that supports the knowledge
economy have increased (Bullen, Kenway, and Fahey 2010). Corresponding
requirements for increased accountability and quality assurance therefore
enable the state to steer from a distance (Blackmore and Sachs 2007). These
trends have directed substantial attention towards university governance and
streamlined, less bureaucratic decision-making within universities.
Accordingly, there has been an increase in size and a consolidation of power
within the ofﬁce of the vice-chancellor (also known as the principal or
president) and in the decision-making authority of the university council or
governing body, and a corresponding diminution of the role of academic
board (Marginson and Considine 2000).
Despite the magnitude of these shifts, there is very little current empiri-
cal research about changes in university governance practices, and about
academic boards speciﬁcally. At least partly in response, this article reports
recent empirical research on Australian university academic boards con-
ducted as part of a larger study of higher education governance. The article
commences with a Bourdieuian theoretical analysis of changes to Australian
university academic board power bases within the past 30 years to demon-
strate domination by managerial forms of governance. However, although
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power can be useful in explaining the locus
of power currently held by university vice-chancellors, it relies on the domi-
nated being unaware of the unequal power relations or of misrecognising
them as ‘natural’. This does not explain the implied consent of staff for the
dominance of the vice-chancellor and senior executive that was highlighted
by the research ﬁndings. However, such consent can be usefully explored in
the context of Gramsci’s hegemony (Gramsci 1971). Hegemony also
explains observed changes in the nature of collegial governance, whereby
managers rather than professors exercised hegemonic authority, operating as
a self-governing community that sought to perpetuate its own power within
the neoliberal steering from a distance environment currently facilitated by
government. The article argues that the data therefore suggest the continued
but subordinate existence of a modiﬁed form of collegial governance in
which hegemony is exercised by management rather than by the professor.
However, collegial governance is also dependent upon a community of
scholars, a role historically played by the academic board. In view of the
suggested transition in collegial governance and the resultant obfuscation of
the distinction between academic work and management, the article
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concludes by raising questions about whether academic boards can continue
to serve as communities of scholars in future.
In taking this position, the article seeks to extend understandings of the
limitations of Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power and, at the same time,
to encourage a rethinking of the implications of managerial hegemony for
collegial governance within contemporary universities. Although the article
draws on Australian data, the implications are applicable more generally
and also make use of academic boards as a lens through which signiﬁcant
changes to higher education governance can be viewed.
Bourdieu, power and higher education
A central theme of Bourdieu’s oeuvre is an attempt to overcome the
theoretical divide between objectivism and subjectivism (see, for example,
Bourdieu 1990, 25), or between the world as constructed by personal, lived
experience and the concept of a physical reality independent of this (Jenkins
2002). Bourdieu does this, in part, through the notions of habitus and ﬁeld,
which ‘are intended to offer an alternative conceptualisation of the subject,
as socially embedded, as embodied dispositions, shaped by one’s location
within social ﬁelds’ (Kenway and McLeod 2004, 528). For Bourdieu, the
habitus is a mental structure through which the world can be understood
and is itself a ‘product of the internalization of the structures of that world’
(1989, 18). It is habitus that brings together the subjective and the objective,
and in so doing recognises the role that each plays in constituting the other
(Reay 2004).
Bourdieu characterises a ﬁeld as an internally regulated ‘social universe’
(Bourdieu 1993, 162) and he understood universities as positioned inside a
broader university ﬁeld or ﬁeld of higher education (Naidoo 2003). Within
the context of speciﬁc ﬁelds, Bourdieu described assets of various kinds as
capital (Bourdieu 1986), including two forms particular to the university
environment: intellectual capital, which is akin to scholarly expertise and
reputation; and academic capital, which refers to hierarchical control of a
department or organisation (Bourdieu 1988). However, it is important to dif-
ferentiate between Bourdieu’s academic capital and the notion of ‘academic
capitalism’ ﬁrst used by Slaughter and Leslie (1997, 8) in the 1990s. Thus,
whereas academic capitalism is about the sale of the products of academia
within a market, academic capital, in Bourdieu’s terms, relates to the work-
ings of management within an academic institution.
For Bourdieu, power is integral to the construction and functioning of
the social order (Swartz 1997). Bourdieu invokes power directly when he
describes capital and power as being ‘the same thing’ (1986, 243), and in
Homo Academicus he clearly depicts academic and intellectual capital as
opposing forms of power (Bourdieu 1988). However, Bourdieu also
describes a broader ﬁeld of power in the form of an ‘overall social ﬁeld’
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(1996, 271), which serves as an arena for ‘struggle over the power to dictate
the dominant principle of domination’ (1996, 265; original emphasis). That
is to say, within the overarching ﬁeld of power encompassing various indi-
vidual ﬁelds, there is played out a struggle for the ‘right to dominate
throughout the social order’ (Swartz 2010, 47). Thus, within higher educa-
tion an academic staff member may be dominant within their intellectual
ﬁeld but subordinate within the broader ﬁeld of power in which the most
legitimate forms of capital are economic and political power. In Bourdieu’s
terms, this struggle between intellectual and management knowledge plays
out as an ongoing contest between intellectual and academic capital (Kloot
2009), or between the power of the scholar and the power of the manager.
The shifting power of the academic board
Data reported within this article were collected during 2010 as part of a
qualitative research project that included a multiple instrumental case study
of three academic boards from publicly funded Australian universities. In
Australian universities, the vice-chancellor serves as the chief executive
ofﬁcer and the council is responsible for university governance and for
overseeing management, while the academic board is generally responsible
to the council for oversight of academic affairs. Data collection techniques
at each university comprised interviews with the vice-chancellor, members
of the senior executive (including the deputy vice-chancellor [academic] or
equivalent), the academic board chair and at least four current and former
elected academic board members; direct observation of academic board
meetings; and analysis of a very comprehensive set of current and historic
academic board documents (dating back to each university’s establishment),
including agendas, minutes, terms of reference and operating procedures.
Interview questions were semi-structured and open ended, and explored a
range of issues about current and former roles and functions of the aca-
demic board together with others about university decision-making and rela-
tionships between key groups. Thirty-one interviews were conducted in
total, across the three universities. While data were initially converted to
text and coded, the combination of methods enabled triangulation to
improve reliability and depth. For example, respondents’ perceptions about
changes in their academic board over time could be compared with the very
detailed historical records available at each of the three case-study universi-
ties, including academic board minutes that showed precisely what each
academic board had decided, what its membership comprised and how it
had operated at various points in the university’s history. Consistent with
this approach, data analysis initially took place within each case but then
expanded to incorporate extensive and detailed cross-case analysis.
Purposive sampling enabled selection of three universities with ‘maxi-
mum variation’ between them. Thus, one was a new dual-sector university
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established after 1986 (hereafter described as ‘Newtown’ University); one
was a prestigious ‘Group of 8’ research-intensive university established
before 1914 (described as ‘Historydale’ University); and one was estab-
lished in between these two age groupings as a comprehensive university
with a strong focus on both research and teaching (described as ‘Middleton’
University). Further ensuring variation, the universities were each from a
different Australian state. There were also manifest differences between the
three academic boards in physical characteristics such as size, composition
and mode of establishment, and these ensured that the sample reﬂected
some of the variation between academic boards across Australian universi-
ties. However, a signiﬁcant limitation remains the number of cases studied.
Thus, the sample size of three cannot represent all academic boards cur-
rently in operation within Australian publicly funded universities. However,
common patterns within the data have suggested some modiﬁcations to
existing theory and, consistent with the limits for generalising the ﬁndings
of case-study data (Yin 2003), these may have wider applicability.
Within western democratic higher education the period between the 1900s
and the 1980s has been widely characterised as the collegial governance era
(Deem 1998) during which groups of elected academic leaders made deci-
sions for their universities on behalf of their peers (Bleiklie 2012). Collegial
governance both generated and enabled the control of substantial intellectual
capital reserves, partly because the decision-makers were the most senior aca-
demics but also because the focus of decisions at that time was generally
internal, academic matters (Rowlands 2013). Not surprisingly, the academic
board was a primary vehicle for collegial governance and, until the late
1970s, academic boards tended to have signiﬁcant power and inﬂuence and
therefore determined a complex range of matters (Marginson and Considine
2000; Moodie and Eustace 1974). Indeed, it is argued that at this time ‘aca-
demic boards not only oversaw the academic affairs of their universities, but
effectively ran them’ (Rowlands 2013, 5). However, consistent with progres-
sive changes within the broader higher education ﬁeld noted earlier in this
article that have led to the domination of managerial and entrepreneurial
forms of governance, the commencement of the 1980s saw the beginning of
a shift in the balance of power within universities from intellectual to aca-
demic capital (Rowlands 2013). Although the reasons for this varied between
nation-states (Meek 2003a), some of the changes manifested in very similar
ways (Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Signiﬁcantly, universities have generally
replaced elected academic leaders with appointed managers and there has
been considerable growth in the numbers of such appointments, both in
Australia and internationally (Marginson and Considine 2000). Thus, what
might be described as the ‘executivisation’ of universities, comprising an
increase in the size and scope of the ofﬁce of the vice-chancellor and his or
her executive team, is one of the most inﬂuential changes to university struc-
tures and management styles within the past 30 years (Shattock 2013). These
British Journal of Sociology of Education 1021
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appointments have substantially increased both the amount and the relative
value of academic capital within universities and are at least partly a response
to higher education funding constraints and vastly increased student numbers,
resulting in the need for commercially earned income and faster, market-
focused focused decision-making (Middlehurst 2013). Moreover, the sector
has experienced signiﬁcant government demands for an accountability regime
focused on risk management, process control and compliance (Harvey and
Williams 2010), within which governance is required to mediate between the
state and the university (Blackmore 2011), to demonstrate a return on govern-
ment investment in higher education and to facilitate expanded relationships
between universities, business and industry (Slaughter and Leslie 1997).
These changes have impacted directly on governance processes currently in
place, including by way of the rise of the management advisory committee
whose membership is chosen by the vice-chancellor (rather than members
being elected by academic staff, as may have been the case in the past), and
the pre-eminence of the university council as the body responsible for ﬁnal
approval of strategic and ﬁnancial decisions. Accordingly, the literature
reports that the combination of these changes has resulted in a substantial
diminution in academic board authority and autonomy, not only within
Australia but also within the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Rowlands
2013).
While the age of the newest case-study university, Newtown University,
precludes a tracing of any such changes to its academic board over time,
comparisons are possible for the two older case-study universities. These
data show that in 2010 the academic boards from Middleton University and
Historydale University had fewer professorial members than was the case
prior to the 1980s, were both somewhat smaller in size and were substan-
tially less central to university decision-making. A more managerial envi-
ronment was described as having largely overtaken the role of the two
academic boards, with at least some academic board committees having
been replaced by senior management committees. These changes reportedly
had a profound impact on the balances of power within these universities
and on the place of the academic boards within formal and informal author-
ity networks. Combined with the removal of resourcing and strategic plan-
ning functions from the case-study academic boards’ terms of reference,
these changes appear to reﬂect the shift from intellectual (scholarly) to aca-
demic (management) capital noted above. However, it is important to note
that within the established literature this is not necessarily portrayed as a
smooth transition. For example, collegial governance, such as that tradition-
ally practiced by academic boards, and managerial modes of governance,
such as that commonly associated with university vice-chancellors and exec-
utives, are often characterised as being at opposite ends of a spectrum or
continuum (Deem 1998; Whitchurch and Gordon 2011) or, further, of being
‘pitted against one another’ (Bleiklie 2012, 88), consistent with Bourdieu’s
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notion of a contest between the two opposing froms of capital or power.
Within this context it might therefore have been expected that university
academic staff, particularly long-serving staff, would lament the disempow-
erment of their respective academic board and would wish to see at least a
partial return of some balance between academic and managerial gover-
nance, or at least between managerial and collegial power. However, this
was not reﬂected in the data from either of the two oldest case-study univer-
sities, despite at least one-third of the interviewees having worked at their
respective universities for more than 30 years (and therefore able to remem-
ber, ﬁrst hand, changes to their academic board) and ﬁve of the 20 intervie-
wees from these universities being former elected members of their
respective academic board. Thus, there was a sense at these two universities
that although the changes to the ways in which the academic boards were
structured and operated may not have been entirely desirable, they were
nevertheless necessary in the more ﬁnancially-driven environment in which
universities now operate. Moreover, respondents recognised that their uni-
versity was part a broader, corporatised higher education environment. This
is exempliﬁed in the following interview responses from current and former
elected academic board members at Middleton University:
So as we move towards a more corporate model, operational decisions are
coming at the [university executive] level and strategic oversight directions
are coming from Council. So I’m wondering whether, if the roles of [the aca-
demic board] have changed, that part of that is because of this move within
tertiary education in Australia to a more corporate type approach. I mean we
have to … we are a business whether we like it or not and I think it would
be naive to operate under any other premise. (Elected academic board
member, Middleton University)
These days … initiatives don’t arise bottom-up through the University’s
committee structure; they almost invariably come whistling down from the
[executive group] or just the Vice-Chancellor. And given the way they have
to ﬁt in with what’s happening in the external environment that the University
operates in, and often things have to happen pretty quickly, there’s a degree
to which that has been an inevitable change. I don’t think there is any way in
which you could go back to the old [academic board] role. (Former elected
academic board member, Middleton University)
This suggests not only that the patterns of change observed at Middleton
University were consistent with those described in the literature regarding
the corporatisation of the university and its place within a globalised higher
education market, but that staff were aware of and had sanctioned these
changes and the impact they have had on governance and management
arrangements.
Like Middleton University, there was also a sense at Historydale
University that the changes to their academic board had been inevitable,
British Journal of Sociology of Education 1023
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important and irreversible. For example, an elected member who is also a
former chair of the academic board, noted that:
I’m fairly pragmatic and I don’t believe we can ever go back to the old uni-
versity where the professors pontiﬁcated and decided on budgets and direc-
tions and everything else. I mean that just doesn’t ﬁt any more and nor would
I want it to happen. (Elected academic board member, Historydale University)
Interestingly, Taylor argues that while some academic staff may perceive
managerialism to be a threat to academia, for others it represents a ‘new
division of labour between teaching and research on the one hand and insti-
tutional management on the other’, enabling those staff to concentrate on
their primary areas or interest and concern (2006, 273). That is to say, while
it is possible that some academic staff may perceive managerialism as a
negative force, this is not necessarily always the case. For others, it may
enable an increased focus on academic pursuits. Moreover, much of the aca-
demic literature is critical of the inefﬁciencies, inequality and ineffectiveness
of traditional collegial governance modes and therefore recognises that
change was indeed required (Stensaker and Vabø 2013).
The locus of power within each university and its impact on the
academic board
Within each of the three case-study universities, the locus of power was uni-
versally (i.e. by every single interview respondent) considered to be the
vice-chancellor, consistent with their role as holders of the greatest propor-
tion of academic capital within their respective universities. Thus, within
each of the three universities, key ﬁnancial, strategic and management deci-
sions were seen as being made by the vice-chancellor. To a greater or lesser
extent (depending on the university), this decision-making was shared with
some or all members of the executive group. The corollary of this was that
such decisions were clearly not seen as being within the ambit of the
academic board. Indeed, the effect of the top-down managerial style upon
academic boards was that vice-chancellors, supported by their executives,
were seen to dominate academic board meetings and, in the case of
Middleton University, to also dominate the board agenda.
Domination of the case-study academic boards by senior executives (and
especially by the vice-chancellor) could potentially be theorised using
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power, within which the habitus serves as an
internalisation of structures of the ﬁeld (Bourdieu 1989) and therefore plays
a role in the creation and continuation of inequality. Bourdieu describes the
perpetration of domination as ‘symbolic violence’ that is naturalised within
the ﬁeld and misrecognised by the dominated, ‘creating passivity and con-
formity to a given social order’ (Navarro 2006, 19). Symbolic violence
therefore comprises meanings that are imposed ‘as legitimate by concealing
1024 J. Rowlands
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
7:2
6 2
8 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
5 
the power relations which are the basis of its force’ (Bourdieu and Passeron
1977, 4). In turn, it is misrecognition which makes possible the exercise of
this power. That is to say, with a given ﬁeld in which there is an unequal
distribution of capital, and therefore of resources, the habitus of the domi-
nated becomes ‘so at home with domination that it does not recognize it as
such’ (Burawoy 2008, 43) and, in so doing, the inequality becomes ‘inac-
cessible to consciousness’ (Bourdieu 1984, 172). This results in what
Burawoy describes as the ‘obsfucation’ of the very categories of distinction
that perpetrate the disadvantage (Burawoy 2008, 48).
The extent to which Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence can be
employed to explain the dominance by management of university affairs,
including the academic board, turns on the extent to which those staff who
were dominated acknowledged and accepted the resultant inequalities. This
is because, ‘in Bourdieu’s world, the invisibility of domination is founded
on the concordance of a social structure with a habitus inculcated by the
same social structure’ (Burawoy 2008, 48). Thus, under a regime of
symbolic power, dominated staff would either not notice the power differen-
tial or, if it was noticed, would consider those differences to be part of the
natural order of the world, and therefore accept them without realising that
they were doing so. However, as noted earlier in this article, respondents at
Historydale University reported a signiﬁcant shift from collegial to corpo-
rate-style governance and that a more managerial environment had largely
overtaken the role of the academic board. Similarly, at Middleton University
respondents described the university having adopted a more corporate style
of decision-making, with the academic board being noticeably less central
within this process. At both of these universities the changes had been noted
by respondents and were characterised as being necessary. Moreover,
although the ‘newness’ of Newtown University meant that it was not possi-
ble to trace the rise of managerialism at that institution, academic board
members there appeared aware and accepting of the power differential
between the vice-chancellor and his or her executive and the remainder of
the staff and the academic board. For example, the following quote from an
elected academic board member at Newtown implies that management is
something to be courted and appeased, as would be expected in a relation-
ship with a recognised signiﬁcant power differential:
So it is a real political balance I suppose [for the Board] of upholding the
governance obligations of the University and making sure you’re not chastis-
ing the management in the same process. (Elected academic board member,
Newtown University)
Indeed, Swartz notes that Bourdieu has been subject to sharp criticism
precisely because the concept of misrecognition is inadequate to explain the
reproduction of social hierarchies. Thus, the ‘degree of acceptance and
British Journal of Sociology of Education 1025
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respect for existing hierarchies may be less deeply internalized in numerous
instances than the idea of symbolic violence implies’ (Swartz 2010, 49).
Accordingly, at all three universities it would appear that rather than staff
being unconscious of the unequal power relations between management and
other staff, there was an acknowledgement and an acceptance of the overall
supremacy of both vice-chancellors (and their senior staff), and therefore of
academic capital. This is inconsistent with Bourdieu’s notions of domination
and submission, which are ‘not a matter of consciousness but of habitus,
those deeply embedded perceptions and appreciations, inaccessible to
consciousness’ (Burawoy 2008, 43), and therefore does not accord with
misrecognition.
An alternative conceptual tool is Gramsci’s hegemony, under which the
interests of those governing are presented as being the interests of all
(Bocock 1986). Burawoy argues that key similarities between Bourdieu and
Gramsci include that
Both repudiated Marx’s laws of history, both developed sophisticated notions
of class struggle, and both focused on what Gramsci called the superstructures
of capitalism, what Bourdieu called the ﬁelds of cultural domination, and both
thereby lost sight of the economy, dealing only with its effects. More posi-
tively, both were preeminently interested in questions of domination and
reproduction. (Burawoy 2008, 27)
However, despite their mutual interest in domination and subordination,
Bourdieu and Gramsci had what are described as ‘divergent theories’:
… on the one side [is] Gramsci’s hegemony which is based on consent and
on the other side [is] Bourdieu’s symbolic violence which is based on misrec-
ognition. Hegemony is explicit and overt … while symbolic violence is deep
and unconscious. (Burawoy 2008, 43)
Thus, while for Bourdieu the dominated are unaware of their subjugated
state, for Gramsci domination is manifest and apparent to both parties.
Scholars within the ﬁeld of educational research who draw on both
Bourdieu and Gramsci in the same work include Simon Marginson, who
supplements ‘Bourdieu’s notions of ﬁeld of power, agency, positioned and
position-taking’ with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to explain the
dominance of US universities within global higher education (2008, 303).
Taking this lead, it is argued that hegemony is also a useful concept for the
analysis of power relations within comparatively autonomous Australian
universities because it does not attribute the dominance of managerialism
within the higher education sector, or of vice-chancellors within individual
universities, to the inability of subordinate staff to imagine things any other
way. Instead, hegemony provides for the engagement of staff in the com-
plex processes by which managerialist power regimes gain their ascent,
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drawing together a web of interconnected economic, social, political,
cultural and reputational factors. Consent is therefore a critical factor in the
existence of hegemony (Gramsci 1971), which does not necessarily mean
that the unequal distribution of power is liked by all those involved (Bocock
1986). Moreover, consent can be somewhat passive or subtle in nature
(Femia 1981), achieved by way of the ‘prestige (and consequent conﬁdence)
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the
world of production’ (Gramsci 1971, 12). It can also take the form of
‘“spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental
group’ (Gramsci 1971, 12). Consent to hegemony can therefore be active,
‘rational’ and ‘cognitive’ (Burawoy 2012, 194) but it can also be passive
(Thomas 2013), given by way of participants ‘playing the game’ (Burawoy
2012, 193).
The following comments from academic board members at all three
case-study universities are suggestive of consent to the hegemony of the
vice-chancellor (supported by his or her executive) and the implementation
of what were perceived to be largely corporatist and managerialist agendas,
despite differences in management style amongst the three universities:
I think it is inevitable in the world we currently inhabit. I think, you know,
the dreaming spires and the professorial people sitting around thinking great
thoughts and deciding what they want to do, that independence of universi-
ties, has gone. So I think it’s inevitable. It doesn’t really matter whether it’s
desirable or not, because I don’t think you can turn the clock back. Universi-
ties are becoming budget-driven. Bottom lines, triple bottom lines; we talk
much more about money than we used to. (Executive dean, Middleton
University)
… the VC is the executive ofﬁcer who is meant to run the place. (Elected
academic board member, Historydale University)
The locus of power is with [Vice-Chancellor name] and I would say that that
has shifted over time here. Quite clearly [he/she] was employed as a visionary
here, to shift the University, and [he/she] has achieved that with a great
degree of collegiality. (Pro vice-chancellor and former academic board chair,
Newtown University)
These quotes suggest that within the context of contemporary university
academic boards, consent to managerial domination can therefore be under-
stood to exist when members, particularly elected academic members, indi-
cate that they are aware and consciously accept that this is the way things
are meant to be (at this moment in time). Thus, the hegemony is considered
to be essential but not necessarily enjoyed.
Analyses of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony are highly contested leading
to numerous, frequently ‘opposing interpretations’ (Mouffe 1979, 184). For
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example, while some argue that hegemony involves some combination of
force and consensus (Bates 1975), others maintain that this instead describes
domination and that hegemony excludes force (Bocock 1986). However, it
is also suggested that these two power regimes are mutually dependent and
that ‘[r]ule by consent is ultimately underpinned by rule by force’
(Marginson 2008, 308 citing Gramsci 1971, 10). Although physical force is
not present in universities, it could be argued that other forms of force more
subtly support the hegemony of the vice-chancellor’s senior management
group. Examples include discourses about the need for efﬁciency and mar-
ket orientation to ensure institutional survival, the provision or withdrawal
of budget allocations and the inclusion or exclusion of individuals and
groups from key decision-making bodies. However, while dominance of the
senior executive may currently be underwritten by control over the alloca-
tion of resources, the hegemony of that group is also dependent upon its
ability to mobilise a range of discourses to gain the conﬁdence of the uni-
versity as a whole. For example, all three case-study vice-chancellors spoke
about broad consultation forums that they hosted regularly, providing an
opportunity for the articulation of their vision for the future of their univer-
sity and seeking the input of staff, thereby securing their commitment.
Moreover, the existence of vice-chancellors’ communication mechanisms
and the important role they played in allowing staff to receive information
about and have input into university future directions was veriﬁed by unso-
licited comments from numerous respondents. However, it was also consid-
ered that academic boards served as an important communication conduit
between the university vice-chancellor and grass-roots academic staff, as the
vice-chancellor of Newtown articulated:
[staff ] are slightly suspicious of all these managers worrying about money,
some of whom haven’t come through their world, that is, taught apprentices
or taught PhD students. So these [staff ] have a lot more faith in [the
academic board] than in [management]. And if I’m trying to hear what’s
going on in the University, listening to the Board gives me another ﬂavour
and view-point than simply listening to my managers. My managers will tell
me if this makes sense logically and if they think they’ve got the money and
resources to do it and if they think they can implement it, but they’re not
always feeling the … they might be telling me what I want to hear rather than
feeling the pulse of whether the staff will in fact respond to it well [and] can
make it happen at the local level. (Vice-chancellor, Newtown University)
Further, at Historydale University, the role of the academic board as a
consultative mechanism for the vice-chancellor and senior executive was
formally enshrined in its terms of reference. Indeed, at all three universities
one of the most common reasons given by elected members for attending
academic board meetings was to hear from, see and be seen by the
vice-chancellor and the senior executive members. These data suggest that
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vice-chancellors at the case-study universities appeared to purposefully
and consciously implement a range of mechanisms to ensure that strategies
and mechanisms for the leadership and management of their university were
presented to staff in such a way as to be considered in the best interests of
the university as a whole. This played a signiﬁcant role in securing and
maintaining managerial hegemony. Moreover, the three academic boards
served as a tool for vice-chancellors in the implementation of processes
aimed at securing such hegemony.
Collegial governance in the contemporary Australian university
Although within a proportion of the literature the terms ‘collegiality’ and
‘collegial governance’ appear to be used interchangeably, for the purposes
of this article it is important to differentiate between them. Accordingly,
whereas collegiality encompasses professional and social interaction
between academics, collegial governance involves consensus-based univer-
sity decision-making by academic staff (or a proportion thereof). The com-
mittee system is integral to collegial governance because committees serve
as the ‘chief organ of government’ (Middlehurst 1993, 49). To this end, the
purpose of the committee is to build an agreement out of the range of inputs
into the policy-making process (Tapper and Salter 1992).
Within Anglo-Saxon derived universities, particularly those within
Commonwealth nations, the academic board was historically the principal
committee and was therefore a key site for the implementation of collegial
governance. Moreover, the hegemonic group under a collegial governance
regime was undoubtedly the professor. This resulted in the marginalisation
of staff (such as women) who were ‘not part of the favoured group’ and
also meant key decisions were ‘typically arrived at by a small cadre of deci-
sion-makers’ (Ramsden 1998, 23). That is to say, it is arguable that tradi-
tional collegial governance was ‘elite’ (Dearlove 2002, 258) and did not
involve decision-making by consensus or embrace the whole community of
scholars (Moodie and Eustace 1974). This is contrary to romantic notions of
collegial governance as a synonym for democracy (Middlehurst 1993).
Data from the three case-study academic boards cited within this article
suggest that the imagery of collegial governance continues to exert a power-
ful inﬂuence on some contemporary Australian universities. Moreover, the
academic board was considered by a majority of respondents at both institu-
tions to symbolise collegial governance, which, in turn, was fundamentally
important to their identities as universities. This is exempliﬁed in the
following comments:
Yeah, I mean it [the academic board] has symbolically, through its representa-
tion, through its formality, through its high degree of organisation, of collegial
… of collegiality, that I guess underpins a lot of modern universities; the
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value at least. So I think it plays a symbolic role in those areas. That
shouldn’t be underestimated how important that is. (Deputy vice-chancellor
[academic], Historydale University)
I think that the old fashioned … collegiality in universities is really
represented by a well-constituted academic board. (Academic board chair,
Newtown University)
This symbolism, and the centrality of the academic board to it, is interesting
given the pervasiveness of managerial governance at all three universities. It
suggests a dissonance between the romantic ideal of the university and the
exigencies of actually being one in the twenty-ﬁrst century. Only at Middle-
ton University was there was an attempt by respondents to differentiate
between collegial governance, as traditionally practiced, and democracy.
It is possible to interpret these references to collegial governance within
Newtown University and Historydale University as being vestiges of a
bygone era, whereby aspects of collegial governance such as complex com-
mittee structures and comparatively long and consultative decision-making
processes derive from a collective habitus of university staff that is steeped
in history. However, an alternative interpretation is that collegial governance
has been retained at all three universities, alongside managerialism and other
relevant modes of governance, but that the nature of the collegial gover-
nance has changed. Rather than professors being the hegemonic group
within the collegial governance regime, as was formerly the case, it is
argued that it is now university managers who are hegemonic. That is to
say, the essential architecture of collegial governance remains in place but
there has been a substitution of one hegemonic group for another. This pos-
sibility had clearly occurred to one of the elected members of the academic
board at Historydale University, as is illustrated by the following exchange:
Interviewer: Do you think those decision-making processes have changed in
your time at this University?
Respondent: Probably not. It was probably done by professors in a back room
anyway and people think that Academic Board had a role in doing it but I
suspect it didn’t … the power’s just in a different place [now]. It was even
more autocratic before. (Elected academic board member, Historydale Univer-
sity)
Thus, the hegemonic group (management) arguably operates as a self-
governing community within all three case-study universities wherein the
vice-chancellor serves as chief executive ofﬁcer, being the locus of power.
Moreover, the dominance of academic capital suggests that the vice-chancel-
lor and his or her senior executive manage their respective universities with
a view to perpetuating their authority, supported by the pervasive neoliberal
philosophy of the state or what might otherwise be described as the
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neoliberal doxa (Chopra 2003). Although universities must now respond to
government demands for accountability, they are also arguably freer to man-
age within these constraints than was formerly case when the state was
more directly involved in the provision of higher education (Shore 2010).
Additionally, university executives have tended not to adopt the more
streamlined management approach of the corporate sector but have instead
retained the architecture of collegial governance, such as ‘governance by
committee’ and long and complex consultation processes on many major
decisions. For example, while the decision-making authority of the aca-
demic board may have been at least partly replaced by the university senior
management committee, the decisions largely continue to be made, in all
three case-study universities, by committee; different committees perhaps
from in the past, but committees nonetheless. Further, the three case-study
vice-chancellors had put in place complex consultation processes to seek
staff input to decisions about university future directions, some of which
involved the academic board in what are arguably new and speciﬁc roles.
This did not mean that decision-making was by consensus, but it did reﬂect
steps to secure the hegemony of management by consent.
Conclusion
This article has drawn on Bourdieu’s theories relating to power and higher
education and on the notions of academic and intellectual capital to illus-
trate historical changes in higher education governance and, speciﬁcally, in
the role and function of university academic boards. Reporting data that
suggest the locus of power is now the vice-chancellor and his or her execu-
tive team, contributing to a substantial reduction in academic board power
and a narrowing of its role and function, the analysis posits that Bourdieu’s
theory of symbolic domination does not explain the acceptance by interview
respondents, and particularly by academic staff, of such managerial author-
ity. Instead, the article draws on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to theorise
the conscious and even strategic consent by staff to these arrangements, and
the various methods employed by vice-chancellors to secure such hege-
mony, some of which involve speciﬁc roles for the academic board.
The article has suggested that, in addition to the more dominant modes
of governance including managerialism and bureaucracy, Australian univer-
sities continue to practice collegial governance, albeit in a modiﬁed form.
However, what is arguably missing in the contemporary collegial gover-
nance model, whereby the manager has replaced the professor as the posi-
tion of authority, is the community of scholars. Within traditional collegial
governance, the academic board served as a focus or a hub for the academic
community. Despite the way it may sometimes appear, western democratic
universities are still about the business of generating and transmitting
knowledge; they are not proﬁt-making institutions (Marginson 2010). This
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means that university management needs continued access to expertise in
scholarship and research to do its job properly. The issue is whether man-
agement will continue to see that such expertise should be provided by the
academic board or whether they will seek to serve as communities of schol-
ars themselves, enabling a further reduction in the role and responsibilities
of boards. Indeed, some might suggest that the blurring of distinctions
between academic and management work arising from the movement of
academics into line management positions within managerialist universities
(Whitchurch and Gordon 2011) makes this a distinct possibility.
Interestingly, while some might be horriﬁed by such suggestions,
Bleiklie (2012, 100) warns of the dangers of assuming that groups such as
academic staff have stable priorities and values, noting that ‘perceptions and
deﬁnitions of core values and needs in academic institutions are not static
but dynamic’. Like Taylor (2006), Bleiklie notes that while academic staff
may now be less inﬂuential in matters of institutional decision-making than
was formerly the case, their inﬂuence may merely have shifted to alternative
policy arenas: ‘[a]lthough academic power1 has been weakened within indi-
vidual universities, it is increasingly felt through decisions made by national
and international peer-review mechanisms related to research funding, evalu-
ation and publication’ (2012, 91; original emphasis), including supranational
bodies such as the European Union, the OECD and UNESCO. Perhaps, as
Bleiklie suggests, it is time to reconsider the extent to which ‘universities
perceive the division between academic and administrative power to be
important’ (2012, 97) and to explore what this might mean through further
research that examines the evolving nature of higher education governance
both within and amongst institutions.
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